Δημοσιεύτηκε στον διαδικτυακό τόπο ενημέρωσης και ανάλυσης «NewsTime» με τον τίτλο «Ο πελατειακός φοιτητικός συνδικαλισμός» (Παρασκευή 22 Μαΐου 2009)
Όσοι μέσα στην απελπισία τους από το αναμφίβολα απογοητευτικό επίπεδο της κομματικής αντιπαράθεσης στην κεντρική πολιτική σκηνή σκέφτονται ότι στο μέλλον τα πράγματα (δεν μπορεί!) θα είναι καλύτερα, αφού μια νέα γενιά ανοιχτόμυαλων / μορφωμένων / έντιμων πολιτικών θα έχει αντικαταστήσει την αποτυχημένη / ανίκανη / διεφθαρμένη [συμπληρώστε το επίθετο της αρεσκείας σας] γενιά που είναι σήμερα στα πράγματα, μάλλον καλά θα κάνουν να το ξανασκεφτούν. Εάν ο φοιτητικός συνδικαλισμός δείχνει την ποιότητα των πολιτικών ελίτ και το επίπεδο της πολιτικής κουλτούρας δέκα με είκοσι χρόνια αργότερα (έτσι δεν γινόταν μέχρι τώρα;), τότε το μέλλον μπορεί να είναι χειρότερο από το παρόν – και μάλιστα πολύ.
Υπερβολές; Λίγα κλικ στα φόρουμ των φοιτητικών παρατάξεων (εκεί που ο λόγος των κομματικοποιημένων φοιτητών εκφράζεται χωρίς διαμεσολάβηση), ή στα φιλμάκια που κυκλοφορούν στο you tube (με θέμα π.χ. κάποια πρόσφατη συμπλοκή μεταξύ αντίπαλων κομματικών στρατών σε κάποιο πανεπιστήμιο), θα πείσουν και τους πιο δύσπιστους για μερικές απλές αλήθειες που δεν λέγονται συχνά, αλλά είναι κομμάτι της καθημερινότητας όσων εργάζονται στα Ελληνικά πανεπιστήμια. Ότι δηλαδή η υπερ-πολιτικοποίηση της πρώτης μεταπολίτευσης έχει σταδιακά μετατραπεί σε μια μαχητικότητα κούφια, που συσπειρώνει σε «tribal» βάση, με ελάχιστα ή καθόλου πολιτικά χαρακτηριστικά, με μια κουλτούρα βίαιη, παρόμοια με αυτή των φανατικών οπαδών, και με φόντο την απάθεια πολλών φοιτητών – ειδικά εκείνων που ενδιαφέρονται για τις σπουδές τους.
Η βία του λεγόμενου αντιεξουσιαστικού χώρου είναι η (σχετικά) περισσότερο συζητημένη πτυχή αυτού του προβλήματος. Η εξέγερση του Δεκεμβρίου («το δεύτερο ‘21», σύμφωνα με έναν από τους θεωρητικούς της) άφησε πίσω της μια κληρονομιά βίας, και ανοχής στη βία, η οποία έχει ήδη δώσει πολλά απεχθή δείγματα γραφής (με πιο πρόσφατο την επίθεση στον Μισέλ Φάις), και σίγουρα θα δώσει και άλλα. Ωστόσο, όπως έδειξαν τα αποτελέσματα των φοιτητικών εκλογών της περασμένης εβδομάδας, η εξέγερση δεν προκάλεσε την παραμικρή μετατόπιση στο επίπεδο της πολιτικής συνείδησης. Ούτως ή άλλως, η αντιεξουσιαστική βία έχει σοβαρά κοινωνικά αίτια, αξιοσημείωτη καταστροφική ισχύ, δυνητικά δραματικές συνέπειες για όσους την υφίστανται, αλλά μικρή πολιτική σημασία. Ίσως η μόνη πολιτική συνέπεια των Δεκεμβριανών (εκτός από την αύξηση της επιρροής του ΛΑΟΣ) ήταν η αποκάλυψη της φτώχειας ιδεών και της ηθικής χρεωκοπίας της ριζοσπαστικής αριστεράς – η οποία, εάν βρήκε κάτι μεμπτό στο εφιαλτικό όραμα και στις ακόμη εφιαλτικότερες μεθόδους των παιδιών με τις κουκούλες, δεν μας το έχει πει ακόμη.
Όμως, θα περίμενε κανείς ότι η βία των αντιεξουσιαστών θα προσέκρουε στην αποφασιστική στάση της μεγάλης πλειοψηφίας των πολιτικά ενεργών φοιτητών, και ειδικά όσων πρόσκεινται στα κόμματα εξουσίας. Θα ήταν πράγματι λογικό – αλλά απλώς δεν ισχύει. Συχνά η καταδίκη της βίας εκ μέρους μιας από τις μεγάλες παρατάξεις ακούγεται εξίσου πειστική και εξίσου εμφορούμενη από θέσεις αρχής όπως η καταδίκη εκ μέρους κάποιας ΠΑΕ των βιαιοτήτων που διέπραξαν οι οπαδοί κάποιας άλλης ΠΑΕ. Στο πανεπιστήμιό μου, οι οπαδοί των δύο μεγάλων παρατάξεων την τελευταία χρονιά (δηλ. εν μέσω καταλήψεων και εξεγέρσεων) δεν παρέλειψαν να συγκρουστούν κατά μέσο όρο κάθε δύο μήνες, με απίστευτη αγριότητα και πάντοτε με ασήμαντη αφορμή: τις εγγραφές των πρωτοετών, τις μεταγραφές, και άλλα τέτοια υψίστης σημασίας θέματα.
Αυτή η όψη του φοιτητικού συνδικαλισμού, πολύ λιγότερο συζητημένη, δεν αφορά μόνο τις μορφές της πολιτικής αντιπαράθεσης στα πανεπιστήμια, αλλά και το ίδιο της το περιεχόμενο. Οι φοιτητικές παρατάξεις δεν ασχολούνται πλέον με τον τρόπο μετάδοσης της γνώσης, με την αναπαραγωγή της, με το τι έχει να πει το πανεπιστήμιο για όσα συμβαίνουν στον έξω κόσμο, με την καθημερινότητα της φοιτητικής ζωής, με το τι κάνουν οι φοιτητές όταν παύουν να είναι φοιτητές. Ο κομματικός ανταγωνισμός γίνεται πλέον στη βάση παροχών προς τους φοιτητές-πελάτες.
Άλλοτε οι παρατάξεις «ντουμπλάρουν» τις διοικητικές υπηρεσίες: τυπώνουν το πρόγραμμα των μαθημάτων, των εξετάσεων, τις ώρες γραφείου, τα θέματα προηγούμενων εξετάσεων κτλ.
Άλλοτε προσφέρουν διευκολύνσεις που κάνουν τη ζωή των φοιτητών λιγότερο κοπιαστική αλλά ρίχνουν το επίπεδο των σπουδών: πίεση στα όργανα διοίκησης και κατ’ ιδίαν στους καθηγητές για λιγότερη ύλη, ευκολότερα θέματα, καλύτερους βαθμούς, περισσότερες αναβαθμολογήσεις, περισσότερες εξεταστικές περιόδους κτλ.
Άλλοτε υπονομεύουν ανοιχτά το ρόλο του πανεπιστημίου: αυτοσχέδιες ομιλίες την ώρα του μαθήματος παρά τις διαμαρτυρίες του καθηγητή, συστήματα μαζικής αντιγραφής στις εξετάσεις με χρήση προηγμένων τεχνολογικών μεθόδων κ.ά.
Άλλοτε οι παρατάξεις συνάπτουν συμφωνίες υποστήριξης υποψηφίων πρυτάνεων ή κοσμητόρων με αντάλλαγμα υλικά οφέλη: θέσεις εργασίας, θέσεις σε μεταπτυχιακά προγράμματα, δικαίωμα οργάνωσης πάρτυ (με εισιτήριο!) μέσα στους χώρους του πανεπιστημίου, δικαίωμα λόγου στις εργολαβίες του πανεπιστημίου (π.χ. για το κυλικείο ή το εστιατόριο) και άλλα παρόμοια.
Πράγματα δηλ. που πριν δύο μόλις δεκαετίες ήταν εντελώς αδιανόητα.
Και φυσικά όλα αυτά με φόντο τη συνεχιζόμενη ανυπαρξία της ΕΦΕΕ, το μαρασμό των διοικητικών συμβουλίων, τον εκφυλισμό των γενικών συνελεύσεων, την απουσία κοινά αποδεκτών κανόνων σχετικά με το πώς λαμβάνονται οι αποφάσεις.
Έχουν σημασία όλα αυτά; Νομίζω πως ναι. Οι φοιτητικές παρατάξεις αποτελούν φυσιολογικό κανάλι ανανέωσης του στελεχικού δυναμικού των κομμάτων, και όχι μόνο στη χώρα μας. Εάν αυτό το κανάλι αντί για λαμπρούς επιστήμονες με πολιτική συνείδηση αρχίσει να παράγει στελέχη με νοοτροπία φανατικού οπαδού ή εθισμένα στη συναλλαγή ή στην περιφρόνηση των δημοκρατικών κανόνων ή όλα αυτά μαζί, τότε τι ελπίδα υπάρχει;
22 Μαΐου 2009
1 Μαΐου 2009
Facing up to the culture of violence
Δημοσιεύτηκε στο συλλογικό τόμο του Hellenic Observatory (London School of Economics) με τίτλο «The return of street politics? essays on the December riots in Greece» σε επιμέλεια Spyros Economides & Vassilis Monastiriotis (Μάιος 2009)
It is probablly too soon for a full understanding of what caused the events of December 2008. All I can offer is a random reflection on the state we in Greece find ourselves in, three months later.
A policeman who uses his regulation firearm to kill (cold-bloodedly, according to most accounts) a 15-year old only because the latter shouted abuse at him is obviously an exceptional case. However, the sense of impunity of our security forces, and their perception that they are above the law, is the rule. Not all of them are murderers, certainly. But it is true that the police too often acts with gratuitous brutality (e.g. when dealing with foreign immigrants), that corruption in their ranks is too diffuse, and above all that violent and/or corrupt policemen can always count on the complicity of their colleagues and superiors, as on the “understanding” of judges. Clearly, things are more complicated when there is a dead man (and as young as that), but a way to transform a life sentence at first grade into a mere three-year imprisonment on appeal can always be found. It has happenned before (in the mid-1980s). Why think it will be different this time?
The lack of trust in the willingness and the capacity of the high ranks of the security forces to punish the guilty and take all necessary measures to ensure that no such incidences happen again fits in the context of a more general lack of trust in institutions – all of them. A quick look at the front pages of our daily papers over the past two or three years leaves no doubt. Judges protecting organised crime. Priests, nay monks, going around by helicopter (“to save time”), clinching million euro deals (“for the benefit of our monasteries”), keeping millions on offshore accounts. And, obviously, ministers who use state funds as if these were their private property. A moral degradation never seen before – and all in the reign of a prime minister who came to power with the promise to defeat powerful interests (or literally, with his characteristic elegance, “to beat the pimps”).
To this cocktail, pretty explosive as it is, one ought to add the fact that for too many youths everyday life and future prospects are rather bleak. As shown by international comparisons, our teenagers study more and learn less than most of their European counterparts. Our best universities do a decent job in extremely adverse conditions, but are left little space to breath, squeezed as they are by a suffocating state beaurocracy intent on micro-management of academic affairs on the one hand, and by the endemic contestation (often assuming violent forms) on the part of a minority of their students on the other hand. Youth unemployment is second only to certain lawless regions of the Italian South. The few who do have a job must come to terms with low wages and work insecurity. And, at the background, the asfyxiating presence of a hyper-protective family, which no longer believes in hard work as a value, but likes to cultivate unrealistically high expectations instead.
Crucially, the difficult task of integrating one million recent immigrants (in a native population of 10 million) has been shamefully neglected. Their children spend most of their time in their own ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods in Athens and elsewhere. They go to local state schools, that are gradually abandoned by Greek kids as their families move out, and where they are taught basic numeracy and literacy by increasingly demoralised (and increasingly resigned) teachers. Outside school, in workplaces and in their dealings with the state, they face hostility or, at best, indifference. They have no faith in, and feel no loyalty to, the country that hosts them – and who can blame them?
The above may help make sense of the intensity of so many adolescents’ reaction to the killing of a boy their age. But in order to explain the violence, the damage to banks, the looting of shops, as well as the destruction of state universities, public libraries and national theatres, one needs to turn elsewhere; beyond the repulsion of the middle classes, which might have been more convincing had they been less accustomed to evading taxes and ignoring rules when it suits them; and beyond the hollow words of our radicals, who christen “social revolt” (and by implication, worth our respect) every act of blind and indiscriminate violence at the expense of universities, libraries, theatres and the rest of our public (and, incidentally, defenseless) cultural institutions.
To explain the great number of youth committing acts of violence, and the even greater number of those tolerating such violence, one would have to tackle rather uncomfortable issues. Like the profound indifference (if not open complacence) of many Greeks with respect to the actions of the “17 November” terrorist group that was operative from the early 1970s to the beginning of the current decade. Like the spontaneous solidarity of an overwhelming majority of Greeks to the bloodiest regimes and leaders of our time (Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein and others), on the grounds that they stood up to the Americans. Like the silence of our trade unions, and the lack of attention of our public opinion, to the victims (all foreign workers) of the many accidents at work caused by the reckless drive to complete the stadiums and supporting infrastructure in time for the 2004 Athens Olympics. Like the tacit acceptance of, and the enthusiastic participation to, the collapse of the most elementary rules of civil coexistence that is the everyday chaos of motor traffic. Like the resignation of so many in front of the regular and perfectly organised clashes between rival football fans.
Early responses to the crisis on the part of the political elite have often verged on overt or covert indulgence, of the “these-kids-have-good-reasons-to-be-violent” variety. This show of remorse is too shallow and insincere to be convincing. In any case, it will take much more than that for an exit from the current political crisis, just as the economic crisis begins to bite. The culture of violence is not easy to defeat, not by a polity that lacks the moral authority to combat it, nor in a society that refuses to acknowledge its existence. This time, no short cuts are on offer. As the saying goes, a crisis can be an opportunity to amend the bad old ways and make a fresh start. Will we Greeks be up to it?
It is probablly too soon for a full understanding of what caused the events of December 2008. All I can offer is a random reflection on the state we in Greece find ourselves in, three months later.
A policeman who uses his regulation firearm to kill (cold-bloodedly, according to most accounts) a 15-year old only because the latter shouted abuse at him is obviously an exceptional case. However, the sense of impunity of our security forces, and their perception that they are above the law, is the rule. Not all of them are murderers, certainly. But it is true that the police too often acts with gratuitous brutality (e.g. when dealing with foreign immigrants), that corruption in their ranks is too diffuse, and above all that violent and/or corrupt policemen can always count on the complicity of their colleagues and superiors, as on the “understanding” of judges. Clearly, things are more complicated when there is a dead man (and as young as that), but a way to transform a life sentence at first grade into a mere three-year imprisonment on appeal can always be found. It has happenned before (in the mid-1980s). Why think it will be different this time?
The lack of trust in the willingness and the capacity of the high ranks of the security forces to punish the guilty and take all necessary measures to ensure that no such incidences happen again fits in the context of a more general lack of trust in institutions – all of them. A quick look at the front pages of our daily papers over the past two or three years leaves no doubt. Judges protecting organised crime. Priests, nay monks, going around by helicopter (“to save time”), clinching million euro deals (“for the benefit of our monasteries”), keeping millions on offshore accounts. And, obviously, ministers who use state funds as if these were their private property. A moral degradation never seen before – and all in the reign of a prime minister who came to power with the promise to defeat powerful interests (or literally, with his characteristic elegance, “to beat the pimps”).
To this cocktail, pretty explosive as it is, one ought to add the fact that for too many youths everyday life and future prospects are rather bleak. As shown by international comparisons, our teenagers study more and learn less than most of their European counterparts. Our best universities do a decent job in extremely adverse conditions, but are left little space to breath, squeezed as they are by a suffocating state beaurocracy intent on micro-management of academic affairs on the one hand, and by the endemic contestation (often assuming violent forms) on the part of a minority of their students on the other hand. Youth unemployment is second only to certain lawless regions of the Italian South. The few who do have a job must come to terms with low wages and work insecurity. And, at the background, the asfyxiating presence of a hyper-protective family, which no longer believes in hard work as a value, but likes to cultivate unrealistically high expectations instead.
Crucially, the difficult task of integrating one million recent immigrants (in a native population of 10 million) has been shamefully neglected. Their children spend most of their time in their own ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods in Athens and elsewhere. They go to local state schools, that are gradually abandoned by Greek kids as their families move out, and where they are taught basic numeracy and literacy by increasingly demoralised (and increasingly resigned) teachers. Outside school, in workplaces and in their dealings with the state, they face hostility or, at best, indifference. They have no faith in, and feel no loyalty to, the country that hosts them – and who can blame them?
The above may help make sense of the intensity of so many adolescents’ reaction to the killing of a boy their age. But in order to explain the violence, the damage to banks, the looting of shops, as well as the destruction of state universities, public libraries and national theatres, one needs to turn elsewhere; beyond the repulsion of the middle classes, which might have been more convincing had they been less accustomed to evading taxes and ignoring rules when it suits them; and beyond the hollow words of our radicals, who christen “social revolt” (and by implication, worth our respect) every act of blind and indiscriminate violence at the expense of universities, libraries, theatres and the rest of our public (and, incidentally, defenseless) cultural institutions.
To explain the great number of youth committing acts of violence, and the even greater number of those tolerating such violence, one would have to tackle rather uncomfortable issues. Like the profound indifference (if not open complacence) of many Greeks with respect to the actions of the “17 November” terrorist group that was operative from the early 1970s to the beginning of the current decade. Like the spontaneous solidarity of an overwhelming majority of Greeks to the bloodiest regimes and leaders of our time (Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein and others), on the grounds that they stood up to the Americans. Like the silence of our trade unions, and the lack of attention of our public opinion, to the victims (all foreign workers) of the many accidents at work caused by the reckless drive to complete the stadiums and supporting infrastructure in time for the 2004 Athens Olympics. Like the tacit acceptance of, and the enthusiastic participation to, the collapse of the most elementary rules of civil coexistence that is the everyday chaos of motor traffic. Like the resignation of so many in front of the regular and perfectly organised clashes between rival football fans.
Early responses to the crisis on the part of the political elite have often verged on overt or covert indulgence, of the “these-kids-have-good-reasons-to-be-violent” variety. This show of remorse is too shallow and insincere to be convincing. In any case, it will take much more than that for an exit from the current political crisis, just as the economic crisis begins to bite. The culture of violence is not easy to defeat, not by a polity that lacks the moral authority to combat it, nor in a society that refuses to acknowledge its existence. This time, no short cuts are on offer. As the saying goes, a crisis can be an opportunity to amend the bad old ways and make a fresh start. Will we Greeks be up to it?
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