14 Μαρτίου 2024

Who's afraid of the welfare state now?

Preface to our book «Who's Afraid of the Welfare State Now?» (with Anton Hemerijck), published by Oxford University Press (14 March 2024).

Our manuscript was virtually complete when the sky over Europe darkened once again, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The war has already cost thousands of lives, often of civilians.

Its implications for other Europeans have so far been limited to anxiety about the future, fear of energy and food shortages, and rising prices. All member states of the European Union (EU) have reacted swiftly, temporarily compensating households for at least part of the purchasing power being lost to inflation. Often, such measures have been targeted at the most vulnerable. At the same time, western governments have committed themselves to raising military expenditure, while Sweden and Finland have initiated the process of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The short-term effects of all this on the welfare state can hardly be positive. Inevitably, the need to deter aggression and protect our freedoms, and the wish to shelter low-income families from the effects of inflation, will limit the fiscal space available for the ambitious social investment our book advocates. Nevertheless, in the medium and longer term this trade-off no longer applies: far from crowding out scarce resources better deployed to more pressing needs, a well-funded welfare state makes a crucial contribution to the resilience of liberal democracies.

Historical precedent supports this view. One might have thought that the aftermath of the battle of El Alamein (November 1942), when the fate of World War II hung in the balance, was not a good time to discuss building a welfare state. And yet that is exactly what British troops in north Africa did, at many improvised conferences only a few kilometres from the front. The report by William Beveridge (1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services, fresh off the Ministry of Information press, was meticulously introduced by officers and eagerly read by soldiers. Sceptics had to concede that the cultivation of the realistic expectation of a fairer social order boosted the war effort, did not distract from it.

And when the war ended, les trente glorieuses ushered in a long period of inclusive growth, which demonstrated that it is perfectly possible to combine economic prosperity, political freedoms, and social cohesion. Building robust welfare states helped the west fend off the Soviet challenge.

In 1944, with the end in sight, Beveridge was however so alarmed that the British Treasury – obsessed with balancing the budget, no matter what – might undermine the postwar social contract, and with it the welfare-state construction for which his 1942 report had provided a blueprint, that he resolved to speak up. The conclusion to his follow-up report, Full Employment in a Free Society, amounted to an eloquent call to avoid the policy failures of the previous postwar era, which in place of the ‘homes for heroes’ promised in 1918 had delivered the Great Depression of the 1930s.

To the relief of an entire generation, in 1945 policy-makers listened. Contemporary Europeans must have shared that relief when in 2020 EU leaders cast fiscal caution to the wind, in favour of a commitment to fund the ‘recovery and resilience’ of the European economy.

In yet another uncanny resemblance, Beveridge was fairly sanguine that the postwar welfare state, if sufficiently resourced, was perfectly capable of defeating four of ‘the five giants’ he identified: Want, Disease, Squalor, and Idleness. He was more worried about the fifth (Beveridge, 1944: 256):

Ignorance is an evil weed, which dictators may cultivate among their dupes, but which no democracy can afford among its citizens. … Learning should not end with school. Learning and life must be kept together throughout life; democracies will not be well governed till that is done.

In the same spirit, our call for an ambitious programme of social investment in skills does not stem from a utilitarian understanding of the requirements of a knowledge economy. Rather, to defeat the ‘evil weed’ of ignorance, cultivated by Vladimir Putin in Russia and Ukraine (and by his populist admirers within our liberal democracies), and to preserve our values and liberties, will require the constant tending to, and upkeeping of, citizens’ critical capacities.

In his 1599 play As You Like It, William Shakespeare came up with the wonderful line ‘Sweet are the uses of adversity’. Over the last fifteen years or so, European welfare states have had more than their fair share of adversity. As a result, we are all wiser now. We no longer hear the trite claim that the welfare state is a luxury which at times of hardship we cannot afford. The contrary view has gained ground—that the welfare state is part and parcel of what makes Europe such an attractive place to work, live, raise a family, pursue happiness, and enjoy freedom. 

Investing in the welfare state makes our societies less unequal, our economies more dynamic, our citizens happier, our political systems more stable. In short, it makes our democracies stronger.

Florence and Milan, January 2024